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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Darcy Murphy appeals, contending that
motion for credit for time served, particularly as it

district court erred when it denied his
to two periods of time, totaling

sixty-eight days, during which he was incarcerated while awaiting disposition of alleged
probation violations.

Case law is clear that defendants on probation are entitled to

credit for such periods of incarceration. Therefore, this Court should vacate the district
court's order denying Mr. Murphy's motion for credit for time served and remand this
case for an order granting him the credit to which he is entitled.

Alternatively, he

requests that this Court remand this case for a proper calculation of the credit for time
served to which Mr. Murphy is entitled.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Murphy pied guilty to driving under the influence.

(Supp. R., p.48.) 1 The

district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, on
Mr. Murphy, but decided to retain jurisdiction.

(Supp. R., pp.48-51.)

Mr. Murphy

performed well during that period of retained jurisdiction, and the rider staff
recommended that he be placed on probation. (Supp. PSI, pp.99-106.) As a result, the
district court suspended Mr. Murphy's sentence for a ten-year period of probation.

1

Mr. Murphy filed two appeals in this case: the current appeal from the denial of his
motion for credit, and an already-resolved appeal from the order revoking probation and
executing the sentence. See State v. Murphy, 2014 Unpublished Opinion, No. 452
(Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2014), rev. denied. In this appeal, this Court has taken judicial notice
of the record and transcripts prepared for the appeal from the order revoking probation
(docket number 40812). (R., p.2.) Citations to documents from that record will be
identified as "Supp." Citations to the presentence investigation report (hereinafter, PSI)
included in the supplemental record will refer to the page numbers of the electronic PDF
file "MurphyPSI."
1

(Supp. R., p.82.) As a term of that probation, the district court ordered Mr. Murphy to
complete drug court. (See Supp. R., p.71.) The terms of Mr. Murphy's probation also
provided that Mr. Murphy could serve up to 180 additional days in county jail at the
discretion of his probation officer or the drug court judge. (Supp. R., p.86.)
Unfortunately, Mr. Murphy struggled in the drug court program. At various points,
the drug court staff requested the drug court judge impose intermediate sanctions, such
as jail time or the inmate labor detail. (See, e.g., Supp. PSI, pp.146, 153.) Then, on
December 13, 2011, (approximately five months after Mr. Murphy was placed on
probation), following a confrontation with a technician performing a urinalysis test, the
drug court staff recommended that Mr. Murphy be jailed for an indeterminate period of
time while the staff determined whether he should be discharged from the drug court
program.

(Supp. PSI, p.140.) Mr. Murphy was arrested that same day.

(R., p.20.)

Mr. Murphy was ultimately recommended for discharge and the state filed a motion for a
bench warrant for a probation violation, alleging that Mr. Murphy had violated the terms
of his probation by failing to complete drug court.

(Supp. PSI, p.139; Supp.

R., pp.90-91.) However, on January 11, 2012, the district court decided, rather than
revoke Mr. Murphy's probation, it would require him to complete the jail's in-patient
treatment program and then allow him to continue drug court. (Supp. R., p.99 (order for
Mr. Murphy's participation in the in-patient program); see Supp. PSI, p.138 (drug court
progress report dated February 21, 2012, discussing the treatment plan for Mr. Murphy
upon release after he completed the in-patient program).)
Subsequently, Mr. Murphy was able to progress to Phase II of the drug court
program. (Supp. R., pp.104-05.) However, he continued to struggle to adhere to the
conditions of the program. In response to his struggles, the drug court staff continued to
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recommend, and the drug court judge continued to impose, intermediate sanctions.
(See, e.g., Supp. PSI, p.130; Supp. R., p.106.) Eventually, on January 15, 2013, the

drug court staff confronted Mr. Murphy about a discrepancy in his green card (which
documented his attendance at AA meetings). (Supp. PSI, p.126.) Mr. Murphy admitted
forging an entry on his green card. (Supp. PSI, p.126.) As a result, the drug court staff
recommended that Mr. Murphy be discharged from the program. (Supp. PSI, p.126.)
Mr. Murphy was arrested that same day. (R., p.21.) Mr. Murphy remained in custody
until an admit/deny hearing.

(See Supp. R., p.113.)

At that hearing, he admitted

violating the drug court agreement, and so, admitted violating the terms of his probation.
(Supp. Tr., p.5, Ls.3-19; Supp. Tr., p.7, Ls.4-·10.) As a result of those admissions, the
district court entered an order revoking Mr. Murphy's probation and executing his
sentence on February 21, 2013.
Mr. Murphy filed a notice of appeal from that order, contending that the district
court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and executing his sentence
without modification.

The Court of Appeals has since affirmed the district court's

decisions in that regard. State v. Murphy, 2014 Unpublished Opinion, No. 452 (Ct. App.
Apr. 15, 2014 ), rev. denied.
While that appeal was pending, Mr. Murphy filed a pro se motion for credit for
time served, requesting credit for the "approx[imately] 4 months of time I was not
credited for that [sic] I did serve on this case." (R., pp.11-14.) In support of that motion,
Mr. Murphy submitted records from the Ada County Sheriff's Office which documented
when he had been booked into jail and when he had been released from jail during his
time in the drug court program. (R., pp.16-29.) Among those records were documents
indicating that he contends show that he was incarcerated for two periods of time
3

pending disposition of allegations of probation violation. Those were the periods from
December 13, 2011, through February 22, 2012, and from January 15, 2013, through
February 25, 2013. (R., pp.20-21.) Three days after Mr. Murphy filed his motion, the
district court denied that motion.

(R., p.30.)

Specifically, it found that all periods of

incarceration during Mr. Murphy's period of probation were sanctions for violating drug
court rules.

(R., p.30.) Therefore, it concluded that Mr. Murphy was not entitled to

credit for that time, since "[a] defendant whose probation is revoked is not entitled to
credit for any period of incarceration served as a term and condition of that probation.

State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608, 826 P.2d 1320 (1992); State v. Jakoski, 132 Idaho 67,
966 P.2d 663 (1998)." (R., p.30.)
Mr. Murphy filed a notice of appeal from that order. (R., pp.32-35.) The Idaho
Supreme Court has since determined that Mr. Murphy's notice of appeal was timely filed
pursuant to the prison mailbox rule. (Order to Reinstate Appellate Proceedings, dated
April 25, 2014.)

4

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Murphy's motion for credit for time
served.

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Murphy's Motion For Credit For Time Served
A.

Introduction
While a defendant may not be entitled to credit for time served as a term or

condition of his probation, Idaho law is clear that, when a probationer is incarcerated
pending the disposition of allegations of probation violation, that incarceration is not
related to a term or condition of his probation, and so, he is entitled to credit for that
period of incarceration.

Mr. Murphy requested credit, inter alia, for two periods of

incarceration during which he was awaiting disposition on allegations of probation
violation.

on appeal, he

that

district court erred by denying his

motion for credit for time served in regard to those two periods of incarceration: 1) the
period of time between December 13, 2011, and February 22, 201

and 2) the period

of time between January 15, 2013, and February 25, 2013.

Standard Of Review

B.

"Whether the district court properly applied the law governing credit for time
served

is

a question

of law over which

this

Court exercises free

review."

State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006). However, this Court defers to the
factual findings of the district court unless those factual findings are clearly erroneous, in
that they are not supported by competent and substantial evidence. Id.

C.

Mr. Murphy Is Entitled To Sixty-Eight Days Of Credit For Time Served Awaiting
Disposition Of Allegations Of Probation Violation
There are two statutes which address whether a defendant is entitled to credit for

time served.

The first statute is I.C. § 18-309, which provides that a person "shall

receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment,
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if such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment
was entered." I.C. § 18-309. The second statute, I.C. § 19-2603, specifically addresses
credit as it relates to people who are released on probation,2 and it provides, in relevant
part:
if judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, the original
judgment shall be in full force and effect and may be executed according
to law, and the time such person shall have been at large under such
suspended sentence shall not be counted as a part of the term of his
sentence, but the time of the defendant's sentence shall count from the
date of service of such bench warrant.[3]
I.C. § 19-2603.

Together, these statutes create the general rule that "any period of

incarceration, whether before or after the entry of judgment and imposition of sentence,
counts against the sentence of imprisonment so long as the incarceration is attributable
to the offense or an included offense for which judgment was entered." State v. Buys,
129 Idaho 122, 126 (Ct. App. 1996).

However, the Supreme Court identified an

exception to that general rule in Banks: that a probationer "is not entitled to credit for
the time he voluntarily surrendered to gain probation." Banks, 121 Idaho at 61 0; accord
State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 8-9 (2012). Thus, the question is whether the probationer

Mr. Murphy's request for credit is properly governed by I.C. §19-2603.
The Court of Appeals has subsequently interpreted the requirement for service of a
bench warrant to include incarceration pursuant to functional equivalents of a bench
warrant. See, e.g., State v. Kesling, 155 Idaho 673, 678 (Ct. App. 2013). For example,
an agent's warrant is the functional equivalent of a bench warrant. Id. Similarly, orders
for a defendant's arrest for an allegation of a probation violation may be the functional
equivalent of a bench warrant. State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122, 128 (Ct. App. 1996). In
fact, I.C. § 20-227 authorizes an arrest of a defendant who is in drug court without a
warrant if an authorized person makes a written statement setting forth that the
defendant has violated the conditions of drug court. I.C. § 20-227(1 ). Such a statement
is also the functional equivalent of a bench warrant. Covert, 143 Idaho at 170-71. In
those cases, the defendant is entitled to credit from the date he is taken into custody on
the functional equivalent of the bench warrant. Kessling, 155 Idaho at 678; Covert, 143
Idaho at 171; Buys, 129 Idaho at 128.
2

3
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voluntarily agreed to a particular period of incarceration as a term of probation. Banks,
121 Idaho at 610; Buys, 129 Idaho at 126.
The Court of Appeals has since examined and explained the interplay of the
general rule and the Banks exception:
In State v. Banks ... , the Idaho Supreme Court held that a period of
confinement served solely as a condition of probation is not counted as
time served on the suspended sentence if probation is subsequently
revoked. Any other periods of post-judgment incarceration, however,
must be credited to the sentence. . . . [l]f a defendant was arrested for
probation violations and spent time in confinement awaiting disposition of
the alleged violations, that incarceration must be credited against the
underlying sentence because it was not served voluntarily as a condition
of probation.
State v. Albertson, 135 Idaho 723, 725 (Ct. App. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
In fact, the Court of Appeals has already explained how these rules apply to
cases similar to Mr. Murphy's.

In State v. Lively, Mr. Lively violated the terms of his

probation, but the district court reinstated probation with the additional condition that
Mr. Lively complete the jail's in-patient drug and alcohol program. 131 Idaho 279, 27980 (Ct. App. 1998). Upon a second violation of the terms of probation, the district court
again reinstated Mr. Lively on probation, but ordered that he serve ninety days in jail as
a condition of that reinstatement.

Id. at 280.

Upon a third violation of the terms of

probation, the district court revoked probation and executed Mr. Lively's sentence. Id.
Mr. Lively then moved for credit for several periods of probation: 1) the two periods of
time he served as a condition of probation after being reinstated on probation; and
2) the two periods of time he spent incarcerated awaiting disposition of the allegations
of probation violation. Id.
The Court of Appeals held that, under the Banks exception, Mr. Lively was not
entitled to credit for the two periods of time that he served as conditions of his
8

reinstatement on probation. Id. at 280-81; see also Dana, 137 Idaho at 7-9 (holding that
a defendant is not entitled to credit for periods of discretionary time served after he was
found to have violated the terms of his probation because he had voluntarily agreed to
serve that discretionary time as part of his initial probation agreement). However, the
Lively Court also held that Mr. Lively "is entitled to credit for other periods of

confinement served between the date of his arrest for and the date of disposition of
alleged probation violations." Lively, 131 Idaho at 281; accord Covert, 143 Idaho at
171. The Lively Court relied on the decision in Buys in this regard, as the Buys Court

had determined that the district court erred in concluding that such periods of
incarceration constituted discretionary time served as a condition of probation because
such periods of incarceration were not voluntarily accepted as terms of probation.
Lively, 131 Idaho at 281 (citing Buys, 129 Idaho at 127); see also Albertson, 135 Idaho

at 726.
The record in this case demonstrates that the two periods of incarceration at
issue - December 13, 2011, through February 22, 2012, and January 15, 2013, through
February 25, 2013 - constituted time served between the arrest for and disposition of
two separate allegations of probation violation, and therefore, are not subject to the
Banks exception. Compare Lively, 131 Idaho at 281. By that same token, the record

demonstrates that the district court's conclusion - that these periods of incarceration
were indeterminate sanctions for violations of the drug court agreement, and thus, were
served pursuant to the terms of probation - is clearly erroneous. Compare Buys, 129
Idaho at 127. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Mr. Murphy's motion for
credit for time served for those two periods of incarceration.
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Mr. Murphy Is Entitled To Thirty Days Of Credit For The Time He Served
Between December 13, 2011, And January 15, 2012

1

On December 1

2011, the drug court staff recommended that Mr. Murphy

incarcerated for an indeterminate period of time while the staff considered whether to
recommend that Mr. Murphy be removed from the drug court program based on his
violation of the conditions of that program. (Supp. PSI, p.140.) That recommendation
was the functional equivalent of a bench warrant. See I.C. § 20-227; Covert, 143 Idaho
at 1

The record is also clear that Mr. Murphy was arrested on December 13, 2011.

(R., p.20.)

Therefore, the record demonstrates that Mr. Murphy should have been

earning

it as of

13,2011.

The record is also clear that this period of incarceration did not constitute an
of the discretionary time included in the terms of Mr. Murphy's probation.

Compare Buys, 129 Idaho at 127 (reaching this same conclusion on similar facts).

At a

fundamental level, it is impossible to see how a probationer could ever agree, as a term
of his probation, to be incarcerated so that his probation could be terminated. After all,
the purpose of probation is rehabilitation, and revocation proceedings are designed to
terminate a person's access to that rehabilitative alternative. Therefore, a person who
is going through revocation proceedings cannot agree, as a term of his continuing

probation, to incarceration for a period of time while he potentially will not be continuing
that probation.
This, then, is representative of the difference between a period of incarceration
for an indeterminate sanction (i.e., an authorized punishment for an already-established
violation designed to address the issue then allow the probationer to continue with his
program), and a period of incarceration while proceedings are initiated that could result
in a terminal sanction (i.e., incarceration during revocation proceedings).
10

When the

incarceration is related to an intermediate sanction, such as invocation of discretionary
time, the goal is to help refocus the probationer on compliance with the terms of his
probation, and so, promote his continued rehabilitation. In that case, the incarceration
is part of the probation agreement - the contract between the defendant and the court
to promote the defendant's rehabilitation. See, e.g., Dana, 137 Idaho at 7-9 (discussing
the use of intermediate sanctions as they play toward the ultimate goal of rehabilitation
on probation).
Contrarily, when the state incarcerates a probationer on allegations that could
cause him to lose this rehabilitative opportunity, as well as the liberties he does enjoy
while on probation, that incarceration can hardly be said to be a voluntar/ concession
forwarding the ultimate goal of rehabilitation. Therefore, as the Court of Appeals has
repeatedly recognized, incarceration during revocation proceedings is not in accordance
with an agreed-upon condition of probation.

See, e.g., Covert, 143 Idaho at 171;

Albertson, 135 Idaho at 726; Lively, 131 Idaho at280-81; Buys, 129 Idaho at 127.
At another level, the distinction between intermediate sanctions as a term of
probation and proceedings pending a potential terminal sanction is clear based on the
procedural stance of each. The intermediate sanction is invoked after the district court
or the probation officer has determined that a violation occurred, but has decided not to
initiate revocation proceedings, opting instead to impose the intermediate sanction as a
result of the violation.

On the other hand, a period of incarceration during which

revocation proceedings have been commenced, occurs before a violation has been
proved, and the question of whether the defendant will be allowed to continue on
probation is still in doubt. Therefore, even if the revocation proceedings ultimately do
not result in a revocation, the defendant still was not voluntarily in prison as a result of a
11

proved violation prior to that determination, and therefore, cannot be said to be
voluntarily incarcerated as a term of his probation.
Therefore, the district court's conclusion that the period of incarceration pending
a potential terminal sanction starting on December 13, 2011, was an intermediate
sanction of discretionary time served as a condition of probation is not based on
substantial or competent evidence, and so, is clearly erroneous. Mr. Murphy is entitled
to credit starting on December 13, 2011, when he was arrested based on pending
revocation proceedings.
Furthermore, the record indicates that the disposition was rendered in those
revocation proceedings on January 15, 2012, when the district court ordered that
Mr. Murphy complete the jail's in-patient treatment program, so that he could be
reinstated to drug court and to probation,. (See Supp. R, p.99.) While there was no
formal disposition order entered, the order for Mr. Murphy to complete that additional
program has the same effect. 4 Compare Lively, 131 Idaho at 279-80. Therefore, the
record shows that Mr. Murphy was incarcerated awaiting disposition on pending
allegations of probation violation starting on December 13, 2011, and ending on
January 15, 2012. As a result, Mr. Murphy is entitled to thirty days of credit for that
period of incarceration.

Mr. Murphy recognizes that he is not entitled for credit for the time he served
completing that in-patient program as part of his reinstatement to probation, since
that period of incarceration falls under the Banks exception. See Lively, 131 Idaho at
280-81.
4
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Mr. Murphy Is Entitled To Thirty-Eight Days Of Credit For The Time He
Served Between January 15, 2013, And February 21, 2013
with the

beginning on December 1

2011, Mr. Murphy

was incarcerated on January 15, 2013, as the result of the drug court staff's report that
Mr. Murphy had violated the conditions of the drug court program, and so, should be
considered for discharge from that program. (Supp. PSI, p.126.) For the same reasons
discussed in Section A, supra, the January 1

2013, report is the functional equivalent

of a bench warrant, and that incarceration did not constitute an indeterminate sanction
of discretionary time.

Therefore, the district court's conclusion to the contrary

similarly, clearly erroneous. The record is also clear that
custody on January 1

13.

was taken into

(R., p.21.) Therefore, he should have been earning

credit as of January 15, 201
Those allegations of probation violation were resolved in a disposition order
entered on February 21, 2013, which revoked Mr. Murphy's probation.

(Supp.

R., pp.114-16.) Therefore, the record clearly shows that Mr. Murphy was incarcerated
awaiting disposition on pending allegations of probation violation starting on January 15,
2013, and ending on February 21, 2013. Therefore, Mr. Murphy is entitled to thirty-eight
days of credit for that period of incarceration.

D.

In The Alternative, If The Record Is Not Sufficiently Clear To Determine The Time
For Which Mr. Murphy Is Entitled Credit, This Court Should Remand The Case
For A Proper Calculation Of Credit By The District Court
In cases where it is clear that the district court has erroneously denied a motion

for credit for time served, by the record is not sufficiently clear to establish exactly how
much time the defendant should be credited, the case should be remanded for a proper
credit calculation by the district court with a complete record.
13

See, e.g., Buys, 129

Idaho at 128 (determining that the defendant was entitled to credit, but that the record
was insufficient to say exactly how much credit, and so, the case was remanded for a
proper calculation of credit by the district court); see also State v. Bitkoff, _

P.3d _ ,

2014 WL 5347622, *5 (Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2014) (holding that remand was necessary so
that the district court could determine the proper starting date for the credit calculation).
As the Court of Appeals has explained:
[In such cases, the issue] merit[s] closer examination in the district court.
There, the judge can determine the facts upon a full record, in contrast to
the limited record presented on appeal. Consequently, we vacate the
order denying [the defendant's] motion and remand the case for
reconsideration of the motion by the district court, allowing [the defendant]
to present evidence to that court on his claim. If the district court
determines [the defendant] is entitled to further credit on his sentence, an
order should be entered accordingly by the district court, and a copy
remitted to the Board of Correction.
State v. Chilton, 116 Idaho 274, 276 (Ct. App. 1989). Since Mr. Murphy is entitled to
credit for the time he spent incarcerated awaiting disposition on the allegations of
probation violation, this Court should, at least, remand this case for a proper calculation
of the time which Mr. Murphy should receive.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Murphy respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
denying his motion for credit for time served and remand this case for an order granting
him credit for 68 days of time served. Alternatively, he requests that this Court remand
this case for a proper calculation of the credit for time served to which Mr. Murphy is
entitled.
DATED this 2ih day of October, 2014.
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BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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